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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-FACIAL EXPRESSIONS AND GESTICULATIONS
OF TRIAL JUDGE-PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ON JURY
Defendant was charged with possession of marihuana and other narcotics
in violation of federal statutes.' At the conclusion of the charge to the jury,
counsel for defendant attempted to object to certain facial expressions and
gesticulations made by the trial judge in the course of his instructions. The
judge refused to allow either the objection itself or a description of the grounds
therefor to be incorporated into the record, although he later tried to remedy
this action by supplemental proceedings. 2 Defendant was convicted and appealed. Held, reversed. The accused is entitled to take exception to facial
expressions and gesticulations of the trial judge, and the judge should so
instruct the jury as to remove any erroneous impression from their minds.
Butler v. United States, 188 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
Cases involving objectionable physical conduct by the court in criminal
proceedings have been few in number. This is no doubt due to the extreme
difficulty of preserving any record either of the conduct in question 3 or of its
effect on the outcome of the trial.4 However, the problem is so closely akin
to the cases involving comments or remarks by the judge in the course of
the trial that the same rules will generally be applied. In both situations the
same fundamental proposition is involved: prejudice to the rights of the
parties materially affecting the outcome of the trial. One general principle
has prevailed in the cases. Remarks or conduct of the trial judge must not be
allowed to prejudice the jury and where prejudicial, they will constitute reversible error. 5
However, the courts have not completely agreed as to the best method of
applying this rule. There is a strict view, now rarely followed, under which
remarks or conduct of a certain character are automatically error and result
in reversal on seasonable objection.6 Most of the courts, however, do not
35

1. The statutes violated were 50 STAT. 555 (1937), 26 U.S.C.A. § 2593(a) (1948) ;
614 (1909), as amended, 21 U.S.C.A. § 174 (1948) ; 38 STAT. 785 (1914), as

STAT.

amended, 26 U.S.C.A. § 2553(a) (1948).

2. The appellate court held that the supplemental proceeding couIl not be used to
supplement a record which was never made.
3. See 28 TEXAs L. Rav. 122 (1949).
4. See, e.g., Romney v. United States, 167 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
5. 53 Am. JUm., Trial § 76 (1945) ; 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 987 (1940).
6. See e.g., Sargent v. Roberts, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 337 (1823) ; State v. Murphy,

17 N.D. 48, 115 N.W. 84 (1908); State v. Duvel, 4 N.J. Misc. 719, 134 AtI. 283, (Sup.

Ct. 1926) ; Vaughn v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. Rep. 207, 277 S.W. 646 (1925). See Note,
95 A.L.R. 785 (1935).
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follow the strict view but hold the remarks to be error only if they appear to
have resulted in_ prejudice. Furthermore, it 'is almost always necessary that
such action, take place before the jury.8 Both rules seek the same result-a
fair and impartial trial. The judge must uphold the rights of the state and the
rights of the defendant with equal vigor. To adopt the cause of either party
is beyond the scope of the court's activities. 9
There is little difficulty in deciding which of the views to apply in the
case of physical conduct. To set forth precisely what motions, gesticulations
or facial expressions might constitute prejudicial error, irrespective of the
surrounding circumstances, would be a tremendous task. Thus, the better
approach would be the liberal view holding the judge's conduct to be error
only when it is actually considered injurious in the particular case.
What sort of conduct will be termed prejudicial? Obviously the answer
will vary from case to case. Moreover, in some situations a timely instruction
will cure the error by directing the jurors to disregard the conduct or by
emphasizing that they are the final judges of the fact.10 On the other hand,
some conduct may be so prejudicial that no instructions can cure it."
Conduct is prejudicial when it may sway the jury by indicating the feelings of the judge as to certain facets of the case. There are three primary areas
in which his feelings must not be shown. First and most important, the judge
must do nothing that indicates his opinion of the merits of the case.12 One
aspect of this area, however, concerns individual points of evidence and here
the rules lack uniformity. In some courts the judge must not indicate his
7. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 107 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1939) ; Rettich v. United
States, 84 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1936); Walden v. State, 29 Ala. App. 462, 198 So. 261
(1940); Burgunder v. State, 55 Ariz. 411, 103 P.2d 857 (1945); People v. Doss, 318
Ill. App. 387, 48 N.E.2d 213 (1943); People v. Crow, 304 Mich. 529, 8 NAV.2d 164
(1943) ; Little v. State, 72 Okla. Cr. Rep. 273, 115 P.2d 266 (1941) ; Commonwealth v.
Petrillo, 338 Pa. 65, 12 A.2d 317 (1940) ; State v. Owings, 205 S.C. 314, 31 S.E.2d 906
(1944).
8. See People v. Bolton, 324 Ill. 322, 155 N.E. 310 (1927); State v. Talley, 22
S.W.2d 787 (Mo. 1929) ; Chase v.'State, 103 Tex. Crim. Rep. 433, 281 S.W. 844 (1926);
State v. Lloyd, 138 Wash. 8, 244 Pac. 130 (1926).
9. Trent v. State, 66 Okla. Cr. Rep. 302, 91 P.2d 790 (1939).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Monjar, 147 F.2d 916 (3rd Cir. 1944); Goldstein
v. United States, 63 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1933) ; Patterson v. State, 234 Ala. 342, 175 So.
371 (1937) ; Burgunder v. State, 55 Ariz. 411, 103 P.2d 256 (1940) ; Bell v. State, 164
Ga. 292, 138 S.E. 238 (1927) ; People v. Hanishch, 361 I1. 465, 198 N.E. 220 (1935) ;
Walters v. State, 156 Md. 240, 144 Atl. 252 (1929) ; People v. Van Roy, 227 Mich. 162,
198 N.W. 576 (1924).
11. See De Groot v. United States, 78 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1935) ; People v. Flanagan,
65 Cal. App. 268, 223 Pac. 1014 (1924) ;' State v. Bryant, 189 N.C. 112, 126 S.E. 107
(1925); Viadock v. State, 30 Okla. Crim. Rep. 374, 236 Pac. 56 (1925).
12. See, e.g., Sturdivant v. State, 25 Ala. App. 148, 142 So. 116 (1932) ; Sneed v.
State, 159 Ark. 65, 255 S.W. 895 (1923) ; Smith v. State, 52 Ga. App. 88, 182 S.E. 816
(1935); People v. Egan, 331 Ill. 489, 163 N.E. 357 (1928); People v. Prescott, 268
Mich. 606, 256 N.E. 564 (1934) ; Hansen v. State, 141 Neb. 278, 3 N.W.2d 441 (1942) ;
People v. Raymond, 249 App. Div. 121, 291 N.Y. Supp. 198 (1st Dep't 1936). See 53
Ar. Ji.m, Trial § 75 (1945).
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opinion in any way. 13 The majority of courts allow him to marshal and
review the evidence and state the tendency thereof but will not allow him
to show his opinion in so doing. 14 However, in the federal and a few state
courts the judge may express or show his opinion on the tendency, force and
weight of the evidence.' 5 Nevertheless, where such action is allowed, the jury
should be left free to exercise its own judgment.' 6 Secondly, he must avoid any
word or act that might discredit the defendant with the jury.' 7 Finally, in
most jurisdictions, he may not comment on the credibility of witnesses.1 8
There are two factors which must be considered in determining the desirability of allowing an appeal in instances of objectionable physical behavior
by the court. Making such conduct error may open the door to a flood of
appeals, many of them groundless. Without some adequate means of recording
the nature of the conduct, the appellate courts are faced with an awesome
problem. 19 Despite this risk, the danger of conduct or comment of a prejudicial
character is so serious, though it is generally unintentional, that tlhe parties
must be afforded protection. This same problem is equally important in civil
suits. The average jury is inclined to put great weight on the opinions of the
judge where ascertainable.2 0 In our judicial system the function of the judge
is neither that of moderator nor advocate, but of regulator. His duty is to
preserve the rights of both parties, and he must be careful to restrain himself
with these bounds.
13. See Note, 95 A.L.R. 785 (1935); Parker, The Judical Offlice in the United
States, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 225, 230 (1948).
14. See note 13 supra.
15. ORFIELD, CRIIiNAL PRocEDuE; FROM ARREST To APPEAL 457 (1947) ; Note, 95
A.L.R. 785, 788 (1935) ; Note, 33 ILL. L. REV. 586 (1939).
16. 53 Am. JUR., Trial § 589 (1945).
17. Williams v. State, 18 Ala. App. 573, 93 So. 284 (1922); People v. Mahoney,
201 Cal. 608, 25-8 Pac. 607 (1927) ; People v. Berardi, 321 Ill. 47, 151 N.E. 555 (1926) ;
People v. Crow, 304 Mich. 529, 8 N.W.2d 164 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Brown, .09 Pa.
515, 164 Atl. 726 (1933); State v. Parris, 163 S.C. 295, 161 S.E. 496 (1931); State
v. Jameson, 103 Utah 129, 134 P.2d 173 (1943).
18. Burns v. State, 226 Ala. 117, 145 So. 436 (1933); Williams v. State, 175 Ark.
752, 2 S.W.2d 36 (1927); People v. Van Cleave, 208 Cal. 295, 280 Pac. 983 (1929) ;
People v. Rubin, 366 Ill. 195, 7 N.E.2d 890 (1937) ; Newton v. State, 147 Md. 71, 127
Atl. 123 (1924) ; People v. Lewis, 264 Mich. 83, 249 N.W. 451 (1933) ; Breland v. State,
180 Miss. 830, 178 So. 817 (1938) ; People v. DeMartino, 252 App. Div. 476, 299 N.Y.
Supp. 781 (2d Dep't 1937); State v. Bryant, 189 N.C. 112, 126 S.E. 107 (1925). See
65 A.L.R. 1270 (1930). The federal rule here seems to allow such comment, 113 A.L.R.
19. For a discussion of the procedural problem in the principal case see 39 Go. L.J.
499 (1951). See also 28 TEXAS L. REv. 122 (1949).
20. See Garber v. United States, 145 F.2d 966, 972 (6th Cir. 1944).
1308, 1309 (1938).
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EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT-PERSONS COUNTED TO DETERMINE
WHETHER AN EMPLOYING UNIT HAS REQUISITE NUMBER OF
EMPLOYEES TO CONSTITUTE AN "EMPLOYER"-STUDENTS
WORKING FOR SCHOOL TO PAY TUITION
In plaintiffs' art school certain financially needy students were allowed to
work at odd jobs, thereby gaining credit against the school's charges for
room, board and tuition. The school had five regular employees, and the
students working in payment for their fees brought the total working force
to more than the minimum of eight requred by the Tennessee Employment
Security Act for a taxable employing unit, if such students were to be considered employees within the meaning of the Act. The Commissioner of
Employment Security ruled that they were employees, and the owners of
the school paid the tax. under protest and sued to recover the amount paid.
From a judgment for plaintiffs, the commissioner appealed. Held, reversed.
In the absence of any specific exclusion of students as employees, the services
performed by the students in this case come within the terms of the statutory
definition of employment. Wiley v. Harris,237 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. 1951).
The Employment Security Act provides that "Subject to the other provisions of this subsection, 'employment' means service . . . performed for
- It defines "cwages" as "all
wages or under any contract of hire .

remuneration paid for personal services from whatever source.
"2' The
words of these definitions are sufficiently general that their literal interpretation could easily result in calling student services "employment" under the
Act. However, the rule that a taxing statute should be strictly construed
against the taxing authority has been applied to the Tennessee Unemployment Compensation Law of 1936,3 and would seem to apply to the present Act
as.vell' Many other jurisdictions have. used the saie rule in" construing
similgr acts. 4 The applicati6fi o" this strict rfile of c6fhstfucfion to the language
1. T9NN. ConE ANN. § 6901.26(F) (1) (Williams Supp. 1951).

2. Id. § 6901.26(L).
3. Guaranty Mortgage Co. of Nashville v. Bryant, 179 Tenn. 579, 168 S.W.2d 182
(1943). See Tenn. Pub. Acts 1936, c.l.
4. National School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. Division of Employment Security, 226
S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1950):; accord, Jack Ulmer, Inc. v. Daniel, 193 S.C. 193, 7 S.E.2d 829
(1940) ; Texas Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Bass,, 1-37 Tex. 1, 151 S.W'2d

567 (1941); State v. Musselman, 59 S.E.2d 472 (W.Va. 1950). This should not be
confused with the proposition that an exemption from a -taxing statute should be

strictly construed against the claimant of the- dxemption,: Better Business Bureau of
Washington, D. C., Inc. v. District Unempl6yment Compinsatfon Board, 34"A.2d 614

(D.C. Mun. App. 1943) ; In. re Gem State Acidemy Bakery, 70 Idaho 531, 224 P.2d 529

(1950), 4 VAND. L. REv. 929 (1951); R. C. Huffman Const. Co. v.
Compensation Commission, 184 Va. 727, 36 S.E.2d 641 (1946) ; Note, 55
1055 (1942); 5 VAND. L. REV. 105, 107 (1951). The taxpayer in the
claiming that the services rendered the school were not employment, and

exemption-as such.

Unemployment
HXRv. L. Rav.
instant case is
is not claiming
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of the Act could conceivably lead to a determination that the statute was not
intended to cover student services.
A further guide to the intent of the Tennessee legislature may be derived
from a comparison of the histories of unemployment compensation legislation in Tennessee and in the Federal Government. Since 1939 the federal
Socal Security Act has specifically excluded student services from the definition of employment.5 Plaintiffs argued that since the federal Act and the
va:ious state acts are intended, to work -in harmony the court should not infer
an-intent on the part of the legislature of Tennessee to call student services
"emplpyment." The court countered this by pointing out that the Tennessee
Employment Security Act, as it stands today, was written in 1947, eight years
after the first federal exclusion of student servicesY The Tennessee Act
includes a list, of specific exclusions,7 and the failure to include student services among them, in the face of the federal exclusion, was held to be indicative of an intent to include them in the definition of "employment." There
is a modern trend to interpret statutes by reference to other similar legislation-even though on diverse subject matter or from another jurisdictionas a means of bscertaining the "purpose and course of legislation in general.",,
The warning has been expressed, however, that this manner of construction
"should be employed with caution for the ieason that by way of contrast an
hilcluion or excluion may show an intent exactly contrary to that expressed
by the analogous legislation. . .

."0

This latter view seems to be the theory

10
followed by the court in the instant case.
A previous Tennessee case construing the Unemployment Compensation
Law of 1936, held that the court should "interpret the statute in the manner

which . . . harmonizes all its parts and effectuates its intent" even though

there were contrary interpretations of similar acts in other jurisdictions."
There is, ample authority for the proposition that a state may "determine what
5. The first exclusion of students in the federal statutes was made by the Act of
August 10, 1939, 53 STAT. 1385 (1939). The present exclusion, slightly broader in
effect than the first, was made jn 26 U.S.C.A. § 1426(b) (11) (B) (Supp. 1951).
6. 237 S.W.2d at 557-58.
7. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6901.26 (Williams Supp. 1951).
8. 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNsTmucrioN c. 61 (2d ed., Horack,
1943). This trend should not be confused with the practice of reading statutes in pari
materia where they are designed by a legislative body to operate in a complementary
manner. The trend which Sutherland notes has to do with statutes which have no common purpose, but only happen to ,have a common application-or, as here, with
statutes promulgated by two distict s.overeign bodies. A typical example of this practice
is the interpretation of the Uniform State Laws by reference to interpretation by the
same court of another uniform'law. (e.§., the interpretation of the Uniform Stock Transfer
At in the light of the Negotiable, Instruments Law) and interpretations by one
court of a single uniform law by refeience to the interpretation given it by a court of
another jtirisdiction. Id, § 6102. ',

9. Id. § 6104.
10. 237 S.W.2d at 557-58.
11. Queener v. Magnet Mills, Inc., 179 Tenn. 416, 426, 167 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1942).
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shall constitute employment subject to taxation without regard to existing
even though the state and federal legislation
definitions or categories .. ,,"12
when taken together "contemplates a cooperative legislative effort by State
and National Governments for carrying out a public purpose common to
both."1 3
That the statute is a taxing statute should not obscure the fact that it is
primarily concerned with involuntary unemployment, and that its purpose is
"to prevent . . .spread [of unemployment] and to lighten its burden which

now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his
family."'1 4 With this in mind, the problem arises whether students, as a class,
should b entitled to unemployment benefits (assuming that they could comply
with the other eligibility requirements of the Act). Broad social problems
are involved, and informational resources are said not to be adequate, at
present, for a final determination of the question.' 5 The leading text on the
subject asserts that "To include their wages in the unemployment compensq7
tion tax base, while denying them benefits, as a class, is hardly honest."' 6 ]?erhaps such a course is more illogical than dishonest, but it is evident that a host
of subsidiary questions would be raised by such an inconsistent course. Should
an employer of students, for example,, be given an immediate "experience
rating" and consequent tax reduction 1 7 based on the fact that his employees,

as students, could not apply for benefits under the Act, rather than 'waiting
out the 36 months period required by the Act?1s If, on the other hand,
students of a profit-making school who provide services to the school are
to be eligible for benefits, is this not an unfair discrimination against students
of nonprofit educational institutions, whose services are specifically excluded
from the definition of employment?" 9 The decision in the instant case and
the problems it raises indicafe that the whole subject of student employment
might well be considered by the next session of the legislature with an eye to
drafting into the Employment Security Act specific provisions dealing with
students as employees.
12. Equitable Life Ins. Co.- v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 231 Iowa
889, 2 N.W.2d 262, 265, 139 A.L.R. 885, 890 (1942).
13. Unemployment Compensation Commission of North Carolina v. Wachovia Bank
& Trust Co., 215 N.C. 491, 2 S.W.2d 592 (1939). The Supreme Court of the United
States has stated, "The federal Act, from the nature of its ninety per cent credit device,
is obviously an invitation to the states to enter the field of unemployment insurance ...
but the absence of an invitation as to employers of maritime workers is not to be
construed as a barrier to state action." Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 US.
306, 310, 63 Sup. Ct. 1067, 87 L. Ed. 1416 (1943). See also Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 183, 4 A.2d 640 (1939); Unemployment Compensation Commission v. National Life Ins. Co., 219 N.C. 576, 14 S.E.2d 689 (1941).
14. TENN. CODE ANN. § 690125 (Williams Supp. 1951).
15. ALTmAN, AVA mLBILTY
FOR WORK 194-97 (1950).
16. Id. at 195.
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6901.31(C) (Williams Supp. 1951).

18. Id. § 6901.31(C) (6).
19. Id. § 6901.26 (f) (7) (i).
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FEDERAL JURISDICTION-JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT-INJUNCTION
SUITS
Plaintiff, one of approximately five thousand members of a local labor
union, brought suit as an individual, to enjoin the union from transferring
$114,000 of its assets. From an order granting the injunction the defendant
appealed. Held, reversed. This was not a class or representative suit, and
plaintiff did not reasonably allege a pecuniary loss to himself in excess of
$3000. Therefore, the federal district court was without jurisdiction. Seslar
v. Union Local 901, Inc., 186 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1951).
The federal district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000 exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states.' Generally
the amount in controversy is said to be the value to the plaintiff of the right
which he in good faith asserts in his pleading. 2 This rule, however, is not8
as well established as the statements of text-writers and judges indicate.
In suits for injunctive relief there is further refinement, in that the amount
is sometimes said to be determined on the basis of a primary or secondary
right.4 The prospective nature of the rights involved in these injunction
0
suits makes it difficult for any standard to attain actual uniformity.
Apparently the plaintiff in the present case was relying on the above
general rule to support his allegation of $114,000 as the amount in con1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1949).

2. This is known as the plaintiff-viewpoint rule. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrxC
511 (1st ed. 1938); Dobie, JurisdictionalAmount in the United States District Court,
38 HAiv. L. REv. 733 (1925). For cases see, e.g., McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 56 Sup. Ct. 780, 80 L. Ed. 1135 (1936) ; Central Mexico Light &
Power Co. v. Munch, 116 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Shanesy v. Ford Motor Co., 7 F.R.D.
199 (N.D. Ill. 1946).
3. See, e.g., Sterl v. Sears, 88 F. Supp. 431, 432 (N.D. Tex. 1950) where Dooley,
J. states, ". . . but the rule is that the jurisdictional test of the amount in controversy
takes in view the pecuniary result to either party in the suit." Accord, Ronzio v. Denver
& R.G.W.R.R., 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940). For a discussion of the various methods
and difficulties of determining the amount in controversy, see AssociatedjPress v. Emmett,
45 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Calif. 1942). For criticism of the asserted need for a test see
Note, 4 VAND. L. REv. 146 (1950). For criticism of the jurisdictional amount requirement in general see Wechsler, Federal .Trisdiction and the Revision of the Jvdicial
Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216 (1948).
4. The primary right is the immediate right to be free from the action sought to
be enjoined, while the secondary right is that of being free of the action generally in
thefuture. The question is which is to be evaluated. See Note, 25 CALIF. L. REV.
336 "(1937) (injunction suits).
5. See e.g., Dermody v. Smith, 88 F. Supp. 620, 621 (N.D. Ind. 1949), where
Swygert, J., quoting from Vicksburg, S. & P.R. Co. v. Nattin, 58 F.2d 979, 980 (5th
Cir. 1932), states, "Jurisdiction is based on actuality, not prophecy, the pressure of a
grievance immediately felt and presently measurable in money of the jurisdictional
amount." But cf. Walsh v. Boston & M.R.R., 87 F. Supp. 934, 935 (D. Mass. 1950),
where Sweeney, J., quoting from Harris v. Brown, 6 F.2d 922, 924 (W.D. Ky. 1925),
states, "In injunction cases . . . it is now well settled that the value of the matter in
dispute, for jurisdictional purposes, is not tested by the mere immediate pecuniary
damage resulting from the acts complained of, but by the value of the business or property
right from which protection is sought."
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troversy. 6 Factually this is an unusual situation. Unlike suits where the
plaintiff had the sole interest in the subject matter,7 here he was only one of
5,000 members of the union each of whom had an equal, undivided interest
in the total assets of the organization.8 The problem then was whether an
individual, as such, could allege as his personal interest the whole of such
amount. Can one member enjoin the majority-approved action of the union?
The court in the instant case said that such a result would allow one member
of a class to obtain the same right to jurisdiction as though he had proceeded
in a proper class action,9 even though he acted without authority.' 0 It was
to prevent this anomaly that the court determined the jurisdictional amount
on the basis of the plaintiff's pro rata interest in the $114,000 (i.e. $22.80).
The result is logical and not without support."'
Though this court does not mention any existing authority by which a
different result might be reached, the Supreme Court, in Mississippi &
Missouri, R.R. v. Ward,'2 held that the amount in controversy is to be
determined by the value of the object to be accomplished. Federal courts
have not abandoned the reasoning of the Ward case nor the view that the
amount in controversy can be the loss to defendants.' 3 By applying either of
these standards instead of the plaintiff-viewpoint rule the district court in the
principal case would have had jurisdiction. 14
6. He cites McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 298 U.S. 178,
56 Sup. Ct. 780, 80 L. Ed. 1135 (1936); Bitterman v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
207 U.S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct. 91, 62 L. Ed. 171 (1907) ; Hunt v. New York Cotton Exchange,
205 U.S. 322, 27 Sup. Ct. 529, 51 L. Ed. 821 (1907). All three of these cases look
to the pecuniary value to the plaintiff for amount in controversy, but the Hunt and
Bitteran cases evaluate the secondary rights involved while the McNutt case evaluates
the primary right See note 4 supra.
7. See note 6 supra.
8. This is the converse of the situation in Fitzgerald v. Santoianni, 95 F. Supp.
438 (D. Conn. 1950). There, where a member of a national union in a representative
suit sought to enjoin the transfer of the property of a local union trying to disaffiliate
itself, it was held that there was the requisite jurisdictional amount, determined by the
value to the national union of preventing the transfer. See also Dermody v-. Smith,

88 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1950).

,

-

9. FFn. R. Civ. P. 23.
10. 186 F.2d at 407.
11. See, e.g., Ames v. Mengel Co., 190 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.- 1951) (suit -by- a--shareholder to enjoin sale by corporation) ; Reiling v. Lacy, 93 F. Supp. 462 (D. Md. 1951)
(tax case); Miller v. National City Bank of New York, 69 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y.,
1946) (claim of a certificate holder on a loan) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 65 F. Supp. 916
(W. D. Ark. 1946) (creditor's suit).
12. 2 Black 485, 17 L. Ed. 311 (U.S. 1863) ; cf. Ridder Bros., Inc. v. Blethen, 142
F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944) (action for specific performance of a contract) ; MacCormick
v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. Mo. 1950) (trespass case); Ross v. Southern Ry.,
20 F. Supp. 556 (W.D.S.C. 1937) (suit to enjoin construction by defendant of a plant).
13. See Frankline Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 157 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1946) (action
by insurance company for declaration of liability under a policy) ; Ronzio v. Denver &
R.G.W.R.R., 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940) (suit to enjoin use of water rights) ; Miller
v. First Service Corp., 84 F.2d 680, 109 A.L.R. 1179 (8th Cir. 1936) (creditor's bill) ;
Doggett v. Hunt, 93 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. Ala. 1950) (action to require drilling oil
wells) ; Sterl v. Sears, 88 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Tex. 1950) (action by landlord to evict
tenant) ; Griffith v. Enochs, 43 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. La. 1942) (action to annul judgment) ; Morrow v. Mutual Cas. Co., 20 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Ky. 1937); Enzor v.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 14 F- Supp. 677 (E.D.S.C. 1936).,
14. See note 2 supra.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIE V

I Vor,. 5

LEGAL ETHICS-SOLICITATION'AND FEE SPLITTING-ATTORNEY
CONTRACTING WITH LABOR UNION TO REPRESENT UNION
MEMBERS FOR CONTIGENT FEE
Petitioners, three attorneys, were regional counsel under a contract with
the Legal Aid Department of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen as a
part of a nationwide plan for providing legal services to its members. Under
the original plan petitioners received a 20% contingent fee and turned
25%o of this over to the Department. A second plan called for an aggregate
contingent fee of 25%o under two contracts, one with the petitioners for 19%
and the other with the Brotherhood for 6%o. A final plan called for a flat
contingent fee of 25%o, but the petitioners were required to pay on a quantmn
reruit basis the investigators who were kept on the staff of the Legal Aid
Department and assigned to individual cases. While the members of the
Brotherhood were not compelled to employ regional counsel for the handling
of their lawsuits, they were subject to continuous and strong recommendation
to do so through certain publications and circulars to the members, as well as
by personal visits from officers. The Board of Governors of the State Bar
recommended that petitioners be disciplined for violations of the "solicitation" rule and the "fee splitting" rule of the Rules of Professional Conduct of
the State Bar of California.1 This is a proceeding to seek a review of the
recommendation. Held (5-2) ,2 petitioners' conduct violated both rules. No
disciplinary action should be taken in this case, however, thereby permitting
the opinion, the first expression of this court's views upon the subject, to serve
prospectively as a guide to the members of the profession generally, rather
than to serve retrospectively to the detriment of petitioners. Hildebrand v.
State Bar of California, 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).

Since the, Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American
Bar Association contain, in effect, the same prohibitions as the rules involved in the instant case,3 and since the legal aid plan of the union is
1. "Rule 2, section a, reads: 'A member of The State Bar shall not solicit

professional employment by advertisement or otherwise.' 26 Cal.2d 32... Rule 3, so far
as here pertinent, provides: 'A member of The State Bar shall not employ another to
solicit or obtain, or remunerate another for soliciting or obtaining, professional employment for him; nor, except with a person licensed to practice law, shall he directly or
indirectly share compensation arising out of or incidental to professional employment;
nor ...knowingly accept professional employment offered to him as a result of or as an
incident to the activities of any person not so licensed or of any association or corporation that for compensation controls, directs or influences such employment .... .' 26 Cal.2d
34." 225 P.2d at 510.
2. Per curiam opinion; separate dissents by Carter and Traynor, JJ.
3. Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association. Rule
27 thereof provides: "It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars,
advrertisements . . or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by
personal relations. Indirect advertisements for professional employment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments . ..are reprehensible . ..." Rule 28 provides:
"It is disreputable ... to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal
injuries . . . in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like
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nationwide in scope and represents a goal which may be sought by other
plans in the future, the problem involved assumes paramount importance.
These rules have their origin in the early common law of England, and
at one time any contingent fee contract was void for champerty and maintenance. At the present time, however, such contracts are not, in themselves,
void; and the tendency is to depart from the severity of the old law and still
preserve the principles necessary to prevent the evils that the old law was
created to prevent.!
It has been suggested that since the union is a nonprofit organization,
primarily seeking protection for its members rather than profit for itself or
business for the attorney, there is no substantial danger that a division of
the attorney's loyalty will lead to his placing the organization's interest ahead
of the client's; and that the plan consequently does not fit within the policy
of the prohibitions of the legal ethics canons.6 This view is substantially
supported by an Illinois decisiori involving the same union, in which the court
held that the union's legal aid plan did not involve unethical solicitaton or
'fee-splitting and that the union's motive of providing cheap legal service to
its members was praiseworthy. 7 Two subsequent cases have, however,
rejected this view and held that the motive of the union was immaterial.,
To hold that the motive is of no consequence is perhaps an over-technical
way of reaching a decision; yet, not all the dangers are eliminated by the
union's motive. The union, not the client, fixes the fee. The facts are
investigated by its staff, who, under the plan considered in the instant case,
are compensated by the attorney for such investigaton. The volume of
business thrown to the atto'ney by the union creates an obligation on the
part of the attorney that may conflict, to some degree not susceptible of exact
measurement, with the- duty the attorney owes his client and his profession.
There would be no remedy of disbarment to protect the public against imposition or fraud." In determining whether the plan comes within the literal
meaning of the "fee-splitting" rule'O the question arose as to whether or not
purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly, those who bring or 'influence
the bringing of such cases ...
"
Rule 34 provides: "No division of fees for legal
services is proper, except with another lawyer.... ." Rule 35 provides: "The professional
services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law agency, personal
or corporate... :
4. Ryan v. Pa. R.R., 268 Ill. App.',364, 370 (1932).
5. 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS A T" LAW § 383 (1914) ; 14 C.J.S., Champerty and

Maintenance § 3 (1939).

6. 64 HARv. L. REv. 1374 (1951).
7. Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 IM. App. 364 (1932). But cf. Atchinsoi,
Topeka & S.F. Ry. v. Andrews, 338 Ill. App. 552, 88 N.E.2d 364, 14 A.L.R.2d 728
(1949).
8. In, re O'Neil, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933) ; In re Petition of the Committee
on Rule 28, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 106 (1933).
9. Cf. In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N*Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15, 32 L.R.A. (N.s)
55 (1910).
10. 225 P.2d at 510.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ Vor,. 5

the union, as prohibited by the rule, received compensation in controlling the
employment of attorneys. The majority in the instant case felt that compensation was paid when the union received a percentage of the recovery under
the first two variations of the plan. Under the latest plan, although the
union, as such, received no money, the court held that compensation could be
found in the intangible benefit to the union which results from being able
to offer the service to its members, in that the service would be an inducement to join the union and pay membership dues. If the rule had been interpreted to mean that compensation to the employer must be the motive,
the plan would not have been prohibited by this rule.'
In view of the attitude of the courts and the bar, generally, the interpretation of the above compensation requirement given by the majority
opinion apparently accords with the intent of the drafters of the Rules. The
Canons of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association provide that
12
compensation to influence litigation shall neither be direct nor indirect.
Corporations and unlicensed associations may not practice law" and nonprofit
organizations are included in this prohibition. 14 Agreements between an
attorney and a layman to divide fees or compensation received by the attorney
for business of a third person are generally void as against public policy. 15
This rule applies even though the layman's compensation is for the actual
work of investigation rather than for soliciting or bringing business to the
attorney. 16
A dissenting opinion in the instant case declared that the implications of
the majority opinion would destroy both the legal aid bureaus for the indigent,
17
approved by the American Bar Association, and group medical care plans.
The assertion may be true in connection with certain suggested legal aid
clinics proposed by reputable members of the bar ;18 and some existing legal
aid plans would also probably be destroyed by an application of the majority
opinion.'0 However, the difference between the union's legal aid plan and
11. 3 STAN. L. REv. 549 (1951).
12. Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association, Rule
28, as amended July 26, 1928.
13. People 'e rel. Lawyers' Institute of San Diego v. Merchant's Protective Corp.,
189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922) ; In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E.
15, 32 L.R.A. (N.s.) 55 (1910); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n,
55 R.I. 122, 179 Atl. 139 (1935); 1 THORNTON, ArroRNEYS AT LAW § 35 (1914).
14. People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill.
102, 187
N.E. 823 (1933).
15. 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 436 (1914). See Note, 86 A.L.R. 195
(1933) ; 7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client § 174 (b) (1937).
16. Cates v. Kelley, 55 Ga. App. 786, 191 S.E. 384 (1937).
17. See Carter, J., dissenting, 225 P.2d at 516.
18. See BROWN, LAWYERS AND THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE 273 (1938) : Llewellyn,
The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and Curesf 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 104 (1938).
19. For detailed treatment of legal aid clinics, see BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE
UNITED STATES (1951); AMERICAN BAR AssOcIATION, LEGAL AID IN NEW YORK
(1941); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL AID WORK (1939).
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that of the typical legal aid clinic for the indigent is material. The attorneys
for such a clinic do not charge fees, as a rule, and there is no kickback to the
clinic either by paying the clinic or its sponsors a percentage of the recovery
or by paying their investigators on a quantum meruit basis. There could be
no claim that such a bureau is compensated, either directly or indirectly, for
the right to its services is not conditioned upon the payment of dues, as it is
in the union's plan. The group medical plans mentioned in the dissent are
generally legal if on a nonprofit basis, but there is some conflict in the decisions.20 It is generally believed that the public benefits derived from such
21
organizations outweigh any possible detriment to the profession.
The public benefits sought to be attained by the legal aid plan of the
union here are somewhat similar to those involved in the medical aid plans,
and efforts to make them available will probably continue despite the holding
in the instant case. Are there any variations of the plan actually used which
might eliminate its objectionable features? The union might be able to
avoid the effect of the rules by serving its contractual relationship with the
attorneys while still recommending attorneys which it thought were well
qualified to handle personal injury cases. If this were done, the attorney
could not be justly charged with fee-splitting. Whether the attorney who
participated in such a plan would be guilty of unethical solicitation is more
questionable. Legal writers are not in agreement on whether the'prohibitions
against advertising should be strengthened or relaxed.2 2 There should be
no real objection, however, for a union to list qualified attorneys, as any
layman is also free to tell any other layman what he thinks of any lawyer
or group of lawyers. Could the union agree in advance with its members to
prosecute all personal injury claims and to insure its members against personal injury in the course of their employment? Under this system the union
would be prosecuting a claim which it was under a legal obligation to prose23
cute, or litigating on its own behalf and thus would not be an intermediary.
But such a plan raises other problems such as the application of the insurance
laws, and it is still doubtful whether the canons of ethics would be held not to
be violated by it.
20. See Note, 167 A.L.R. 322 (1947).
21. See Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans, 35 IowA L. REv. 209 (1950)
Hansen, Legal Problems in the Organization and Creation of Group Health Plans, 5
VAND. L. REv. 14 (1951) ; Note, 35 MINx. L. Rxv. 209 (1950).

22. See Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179
At. 139, 146 (1935) ; Sears, A Minnesota Judgeship, 26 ILL. L. REv. 121 (1931) ; Note,
11 J. Amd. Joy. Soc'y 53 (1927). But see Brennon, The Bugaboo "Anmbulance Chasing,"
6 CAL. STATE BAR J. 37 (1931); Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and
Cures? 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 104 (1938).
23. Cf. In re Thibodeau, 295 Mass. 374, 3 N.E.2d 749 (1936) ; see Hicks & Katz,
The Practice of Law by-Laymen and Lay Agencier'41 YALE L.J. 69, 93 (1931).
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NEGLIGENCE-LANDOWNER'S DUTY OF CARE-DUTY
OWED TO FIREMAN
Plaintiff, a fireman, was injured by the collapse of a wall while extinguishing a fire in defendant's warehouse. Defendant. had been aware
of the dangerous condition of the wall for some time prior to the fire, and
during the fire his officers and agents were present but failed to give warning
to plaintiff. The trial court overruled defendant's demurrer and defendant
appealed. Held, affirmed. The complaint stated a cause of action in tort on
the theory of failure of defendant to warn of the known danger. ShypIlnski
v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 45 N.W.2d 549 (Minn. 1951).

Persons who enter upon the land of another are generally classed as
trespagsers, licensees or business visitors, depending upon whether or not
they have the prior consent, express or implied, of the landowner to enter, and
'on whether the entry' is for economic interest of the landowner. For years
the courts have been concerned with the problem involving the legal stattis
of public officials injured upon the land of another while performing their
official duties. Any solution first necessitates a consideration of the status
the injured official occupied at the time of his injury, so as to enable the
courts to ascertain What duty was owed to the complaining party by the
landowner. Once the public official's status is determined, the courts have
then only to apply the general duties and obligations incident to the particular
category.
For the most part, classification of various types of officials has been
arrived at without too much, difficulty. Postmen, city inspectors, meat inspectors, tax inspectors, air raid wardens, etc., have been fitted into one of
the three usual categories and the duties owed them are generally ascertained.1
With respect to policemen and firemen however, the courts have not been
able to agree. Though they were technically trespassers at common law,2
it is obvious that such a classification today would be unwise. Therefore,
the courts generally call them "bare" licensees3 on the basis of a license
1. See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. McBride, 92 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1937) (meat
inspectors); Miller v. Pacific Constructors, 68 Cal. App.2d 529, 157 P.2d 57 (1945)
(city inspectors) ; Anderson & Nelson Distilling Co. v. Hair, 103 Ky. 196, 44 S.W. 658
(1898) (tax inspector). The courts imply an invitation from owner to enter and they
are generally termed invitees or business invitees. Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 96

S.W.2d 369 (1936) (postman); Rashild v. Weill, 46 N.Y,S2d 711 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (air

raid warden).
2. See Bohlen, The Duty of the Landowner Toward'Those Eintering His Premises
of Their On Right, 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 237-38, 340 (1920) ; Bohlen, Fifty Years of

Torts, 50 HA.v. L. REv. 725, 736 n.9 (1937) ; Eldredge, Tort 'Liability To Trespassers,
12 TEmP. LQ. 32-34 (1937); Note, 14 Miss. L.J. 262 (1941).
3. Lunt v. Post Printing and Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 Pac. 203 (1910);
Todd v. Armour and Co., 44 Ga.App. 500, 162 S.E, 394 (1932); Gibson v. Leonard,
143 I1. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892); Aldworth v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3

N.E.2d 1008 (1936); Nekw Omaha T.H.E.L. Co. v. Anderson, 73 Neb. 84, 102 N.W. 89
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provided by law and necessity to enter. 4 There are a few jurisdictions, however, that refuse to term them bare licensees, and instead, place policemen
and firemen in between the trespasser group and licensee group, and refer
to the hybrid result as sui generis.5
In the present case, the court clearly states that it considers the fireman
as a member of a class sui generis.- In comparison with the general holdings
which refer to firemen as bare licensees, the difference is slight because the
end result is the same. Often it is said that no duty is owed them in either
instance by the landowner except to refrain from inflicting any willful or
wanton injury.7 These same general holdings impose upon the landowner
no duty to use care to maintain his premises or buildings in constant repair
awaiting the unexpected arrival of the fireman. 8 In a few instances firemen
have been allowed recovery where the defect was characterized as a trap or
nuisance,9 but despite these occasional decisions the rule persists that a
fireman accepts the land and buildings as he finds them.
The Minnesota court in this instance was presented with the problem of
whether or not to allow a fireman to recover when the landowner, aware of
an existing danger, failed to give warning of it and injury to the fireman
resulted. Considering the question as one of first impression the court
allowed recovery, stating that there is no valid reason why firemen, although
assuming the usual risks incident to their entry upon another's premises in
performance of duty, "should be required to assume the extraordinary risk
(1905) ; Eckes v. Stetler, 98 App. Div. 76, 90 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1st Dep't 1904) ; Beehler
v. Daniels, 18 R.I. 563, 29 Atl. 6 (1894); CooLEY, TORTS § 251 (4th ed., Haggard,
1932) ; POLLOCK, ToRTs 397 (12th ed. 1923) ; PROssER, TORTS 626-27 (1941). A private
person entering to put out a fire is also termed a licensee. Minneapolis General Electric
Co. v. Cronon, 166 Fed. 651 (8th Cir. 1908). Firemen were classified as invitees when
the defendant's premises were situated outside the city limits and beyond the "call
area" of the city fire department with no obligation to respond to owners summons.
Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646 (1922).
4. See Lunt v. Post Printing and Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 Pac. 203 (1910).
5. See, e.g., Smith v. Twin State Gas and.Electric Co. 83 N.H. 439, 144 Atl. 57
(1928); Meirs v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920), apparently
overruling Eckes v. Stetler, 98 App. Div. 76, 90 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1st Dep't 1904).
6. 45 N.W.2d at 550.
7. See Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Electric Co., 158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac. 459 (1910);
Lunt v. Post Printing and Publishing Co. 48 Colo. 316, 110 Pac. 203 (1910) ; Todd v.
Armour and Co. 44 Ga. App. 500, 162 S.E. 394 (1932); Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182,
32 N.E. 182 (1892) ; Woodruff v. Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N.E. 1113 (1893) ; Steinwedel
v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 Atl. 44 (1925); Mulcrone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478, 4
N.W.2d 97, 141 A.L.R. 580 (1942); Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 "Minn.
3, 80 N.W. 693 (1899) ; New Omaha T.H.E.L. Co. v. Anderson, 73 Neb. 84, 102 N.W.
89 (1905); Eckes v. Stetler, 98 App. Div. 76, 90 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1st Dept. 1904);
Baker v. Otis Elevator Co., 78 App. Div. 513, 79 N.Y. Supp. 663 (Sup. Ct. 1903);
Beehler v. Daniels, 18 R.I. 563, 29 Atl. 6 (1894).
8. See cases cited note 7, supra, and 18 HARV. L. REv. 397 (1905).
9. See, e.g., Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 723, 194 Atl. 873 (Sup. Ct.
1937).
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of hidden perils of which they might be warned."' 10 Several other jurisdictions
which have considered the same question have established precedents for this
result."1
NEGLIGENCE-STANDARD OF CARE-ASSURED-CLEAR-DISTANCEAHEAD RULE
Plaintiff was driving along a blacktop road at 50 miles per hour. While
rounding a curve so sharp that his vision was limited to 70 feet, he met
defendant's car, approaching from the opposite direction and a few feet over
on plaintiff's side of the road. Unable to stop, plaintiff skidded and crashed.
In an action for negligence the lower court ruled that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in failing to comply with the
assured-clear-distance rule. Held, this rule will no longer apply as a matter
of law where the motorist encounters a dangerous situation which in the
exercise of reasonable care he had no reason to expect. Halfacre v. Hart, 241
S.W.2d 421 (Tenn. 1951).
Normally the decision as to when an actor's conduct is negligent is one
for the jury, who are given only the general standard of care: that which a
reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstance.' However, when a person's conduct is so clearly negligent that
reasonable men could not disagree, the court will remove the issue from the
jury and hold him negligent as a matter of law. 2 Sometimes appellate courts
tend to crystallize frequently recurring fact situations into judicially framed
rules of law, the violation of which is negligence per se, so that the jury no
longer has discretion in the matter.3 For example, some courts have held
10. 45 N.W.2d at 553.

11. See, e.g., Smith v. Twin State Gas and Electric Co., 83 N.H. 439, 449, 144 Atl.
57, 61 A.L.R. 1015 (1928) ; Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 723, 194 Atl. 873
(1937); Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., 284 N.Y. 397, 31 N.E.2d 503 (1940);
Mason Tire and Rubber Co. v. Lansinger, 15 Ohio App. 310, 316, aff'd, 108 Ohio St.
377, 140 N.E. 770 (1923). But see Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light and Electric Co.,
158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac. 459 (1910) (where an employee of defendant was present);
RESTATEmENT, ToRTS § 342 (1934) ; cf. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn.
389, 242 S.W. 646 (1922).
1. Prickett v. Sulzberger & Sons Co., 57 Okla. 567, 157 Pac. 356 (1916) ; Virginia
Electric & Power Co. v. Steinman, 177 Va. 468, 14 S.E.2d 313 (1941). For discussions of
the relation of court and jury in regard to the standard of care, see PRossER, ToRTS
§ 40 (1941) ; GREEr, JUDGE AND JURY 153-85 (1930).
2. District of Columbia v. Moulton, 182 U.S. 576, 21 Sup. Ct. 840, 45 L. Ed. 1237
(1901) ; Knoxville Traction Co. v. Carroll, 113 Tenn. 514, 82 S.W. 313 (1904) ; Penoso
v. D. Pender Grocery Co., 177 Va. 245, 13 S.E.2d 310 (1941). "[I]t has now become
an almost uniform maxim of law throughout this country, that (1) where the facts are
such that reasonable men might draw different conclusions from them, or (2) where
the evidence with regard to the existence of facts alleged to constitute negligence is in
conflict, the question is one for the jury; otherwise for the court." 1 THE LAW OF
AuTo.-mOBlEs IN TENNESSEE § 23 (3d ed., Michie, 1947).

3.

PRossER, ToRTs, § 41 (1941); 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 285 (1934). In Justice

Holmes' opinion, when a particular state of facts recurs frequently in practice, the cotirt
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that it is negligence as a matter of law for a motorist to drive across a railroad
4
track without stopping to look and listen.
Many courts have held that it is negligence as a matter of law to operate
a motor vehicle at such speed as to be unable to stop within the assured clear
distance ahead as measured by the driver's range of vision.5 Strict application
of the assured-clear-distance rule will bar an action of a motorist who hits
an unlighted obstruction in the road at night, on the ground that he was
contributorily negligent in outdriving his headlights,6 without regard to conditions which might cut down his range of vision. 7 Other courts have rejected
the assured-clear-distance rule, holding that the question of a driver's
negligence is, in most cases, for the jury.8 Even in those jurisdictions which
do apply the rule, the courts have found it necessary to make an increasing
number of exceptions to its application. Thus it has been held that a driver
is excused if his vision is impaired by blinding lights and fog, 9 or if the
should determine for itself a definite standard to govern in similar situations.

HOLMES,

THE Commor LAw 123 (1881). But see Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72
U. OF PA. L. REV. 111, 119 (1924), pointing out the dangers in such judicially formulated

rules of conduct.
4. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24, 72 L. Ed. 167,
56 A.L.R. 645 (1927), in which Justice Holmes states that, "It is true . .. that the
question of due care very generally is left to the jury. But we are dealing with a
standard of conduct, and when the standard is clear it should be laid down once and for
all by the Courts." This view did not long prevail in the Supreme Court, however, for
the court in another "stop-look-listen" case limited the decisions in Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. v. Goodman and indicated the "need for caution in framing standards of behavior
that amount to rules of law. . . .Extraordinary situations may not wisely or fairly be
subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for the common-place or normal."
Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 105, 54 Sup. Ct. 580, 78 L. Ed. 1149, 91 A.L.R.
1049 (1934). See also PRossm,TORTS § 41 (1941).
5. See, e.g., Spencer v.Taylor, 219 Mich. 110, 188 N.W. 461 (1922); West Construction Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520, 172 S.W. 301 (1914). Lauson v. Town of Fond
du Lac, 141 Wis. 57, 123 N.W. 629 (1909), is the leading case. Also see Notes, 44 A.L.R.
1403 (1926), 58 A.L.R. 1493 (1929), 87 A.L.R. 900 (1933), 133 A.L.R. 967 (1941). In
some other states this rule iscovered by statute. See Lindquist v.Thierman, 216 Iowa
170, 248 N.W.504, 87 A.L.R. 893 (1933) ; Smiley v.Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio
St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941), 7 OHIO ST. L.J. 468. For a discussion of the rule's application under statute see Note, 24 IowA L. REv. 128 (1938).
6. West Construction Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520, 172 S.W. 301 (1914) ; Tennessee
Central Ry. v. Schutt, 2 Tenn. App. 514 (M.S. 1926). Even though the principle would
be the same, the assured-clear-distance rule is seldom relied on by a plaintiff to show
negligence of a defendant, since it is usually to the plaintiff's advantage to give the
case to the jury. See, in this connection, Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Auctomobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAW & CoNThrp. PRoB. 476, 477 (1936).
7. The following conditions have in the past been held not to excuse a violation of
the rule: Tyson v. Ford, 228 N.C. 778, 47 S.E.2d 251 (1948) (hill); Cormican v.
Menke, 306 Pa. 156, 159 Atl. 36 (1932) (fog); Knoxville Ry. & Light Co. v.
Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487, 178 S.W. 1117 (1915) (blinding lights of approaching car) ;
Sterchi Brothers Stores, Inc. v. Bird, 15 Tenn. App. 240 (E.S. 1931) (curve in road).
8. Morris v. Sells-Floto Circus, Inc., 65 F.2d 782 (4th Cir. 1933); Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Shipp, 174 Ark. 130, 297 S.W. 856 (1927) ; Sprague v. Herbel, 90 Colo.
134, 6 P.2d 930 (1931); Murray v. Hawthorne, 117 Ore. 319, 244 Pac. 79, 44 A.L.R.
1397 (1926); Morehouse v. City of Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 252 Pac. 157, 58 A.L.R.
1482 (1936).
9. Watson v. Southern Bus Lines, 186 F.2d 981 (6th Cir. 1951).
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object struck is indiscernible'0 or if a sudden occurrence cuts down the as11
sured clear distance.
The rule was first applied in Tennessee in 1914, in a case in which a
driver, who hit an unlighted concrete mixer in the road, was held negligent
as a matter of law for driving at a speed greater than would allow him to stop
within his range of vision. 1 2 Later cases declined to apply the rule where
the object struck was indiscernible even in the exercise of reasonable care.'8
The rule was further modified in Main Street Transfer & Storage Co. 'v.
Smith,' 4 where it was held that a driver could expect that an obstruction
would be lighted according to law, with an indication that "[E]xceptional
circumstances will render the rule inapplicable, as contrary to the practice
and experience of persons of ordinary caution and prudence. ' 15
The court in the instant case interpreted' the decision in Main Street
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith to mean that the assured-distance rule will
no longer be applied in Tennessee as a matter of law, and that the issue of
contributory negligence in such circumstances is one for the jury.'0 In declining to apply the rule as a mechanical matter of law, the Tennessee court
followed the trend of an increasing number of courts 1 and what is generally
considered to be the better view of the matter.' 8 The theory on which the rule
rested, i.e. that all reasonable men would agree that to drive at such a speed
10. Tidwell v. Lewis, 174 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1949) (flatbed trailer in road) ; Foster
& Creighton Co. v. Hale, 32 Tenn. App. 208, 222 S.W.2d 222 (E.S. 1949) (hidden
-depression in' road); Westmoreland Heights v. Martin, 13 Tenn. App. 142 (E.S. 1930).
11. Fleming v. Hartrick, 100 W. Va. 714, 131 S.E. 558 (1926).
12. West Construction Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520, 172 S.W. 301 '(1914). Followed in Knoxville Ry.& Light Co. v. Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487, 178 S.W. 1117 (1915) ;
Cleveland Transfer Co. v. Clark, 6 Tenn. App. 364 (E.S. 1927); Tennessee Central
Ry. v. Schutt, 2 Tenn. App. 514 (M.S. 1926).
13. Westmoreland Heights v. Martin, 13 Tenn. App. 142 (E.S. 1930).
14. 166 Tenn. 482, 63 S.W.2d 665 (1933). Followed in Tidwell v. Lewis, 174 F,2d
173 (6th Cir. 1949); Trigg v. Ferguson Co., 30 Tenn. App. 672, 209 S.W.2d 525 (W.S

1947.)
15. Main Street Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 166 Tenn. 482, 493, 63 S.W,2d
655, 668 (1933).
16. The court in the instant case indicated that the rule might still be applied where
'a motorist hits an obstacle which he should have expected, "for instance, a slow horse
drawn wagon or vehicle proceeding properly on the highway. . . ." in the same direction
as the motorist. 241 S.W.2d at 423. In these situations there is no indication of negligence
on the part of the defendant; therefore a directed verdict would be in order regardless
of the assured-clear-distance rule. Such a result was reached in Quarles v. Gregg, 30
.Tenn. App. 216, 204 S.W.2d 535 (M.S. 1947), even though the court did speak in terms
of the rule,
17. See, 4 RocxY MT. L. Rav. 231, 232 (1932). The trend away from the determination of contributory negligence by rules of law is also reflected in the constitutions
of Arizona and Oklahoma, which require that all issues of contributory negligence be
left for the jury. ApIz. CoIsT. Art. XVIII, § 5; OKrA. CoNsT. Art. XXIII, § 5.
18. Law review commentators have been practically unanimous in criticising the
assured-clear-distance rule. See, e.g., 23 CALIF. L. REv. 498, 502 (1935) ; 12 MiNN. L.
REv. 283 (1928); 5 Wis. L. Rav. 174 (1928). See also PnossER, TORTs § 41 (1941),
pointing out the reaction away from the stop-look-and-listen rule, the rule that a
pedestrian must always look before crossing a street and other rules establishing
negligence as a matter of law.
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as to be unable to stop within the range of vision is negligence, seems untenable in light of the conditions of present day motor travel, with its safe and
unobstructed highways. 19
PERSONAL PROPERTY-TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY-BANK

ACCOUNTS
H and W established a bank account in the name of "Joe Tatum or
wife." W predeceased H and on the latter's death his administrator claimed
that the bank deposit had been held in tenancy by the entirety and had
passed by right of survivorship to H at W's death. W's heirs allege the fund
should go to them according to the laws of descent and distribution, and
the lower court so decreed. Held, reversed. Though not previously decided
in Tennessee, a tenancy by the entirety may be created in a bank account
where intent to do so is clearly shown. Sloan v. Jones, 241 S.W.2d 506
(Tenn. 1951).
At common law tenancy by the entirety was in effect a joint tenancy
modified by the fiction that husband and wife were one.' Its main features
are: (1) tenants must be husband and wife and the tenancy exists only
during coverture, (2) the tenancy cannot be terminated on the independeni
initiative of either spouse and (3) on the death of one the entire property
passes to the sur iving tenant free from the claims of creditors, legatees,
2
heirs and devisees of the deceased.
The modem status of tenancy by the entirety has been confused by the
married woman's property acts and the concept is not recognized in some 29
jurisdictions.3 In Tennessee tenancy by the entirety has been long recognized
19. In Lauson v. Town of Fond du Lac, 141 Wis. 57, 123 N.W. 629 (1909), in which
the rule was first applied, the court said that every reasonable driver must expect that
streets are torn up, bridges washed out and livestock roam the streets. There can be
little doubt that a reasonable driver today does not expect such occurrences. Indeed the
most frequent criticism of the rule is that it is out of line with present day traffic
conditions. See 23 CALIF. L. REv. 498, 502, 503 (1935).
1. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 430 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
2. See generally, 2 TIFFANy, REAL PROPERTY §§ 430-36 (3d ed., Jones, 1939). For
a valuable survey of tenancy by the entirety in the United States, see Phipps, Tenancy
by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24 (1951).
3. This is in spite of Burby's statement that, "A tenancy by the entirety is a form
of concurrent ownership which is recognized in most of the American states. . " ."
BuRBY, REAL PROPERTY 295 (1943). The following eight community property states
do not recognize entireties: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Texas, Washington. Three states consider tenancy by entirety inconsistent
with local views of common law: Connecticut, Bartholomew v. Murry, 61 Conn. 387,
23 Atl. 604 (1891) ; Nebraska, Kenner v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 663, 84 N.W. 92 (1900) ;
Ohio, Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305 (1826). Nine states have held that tenancy
by the entirety was destroyed by the various married women's property acts: Alabama,
Donegan v. Donegan, 103 Ala. 488, 15 So. 823 (1894) ; Colorado, Whyman v. Johnston,
62 Colo. 461, 163 Pac. 76 (1917) ; Illinois, Douds v. Fresen, 392 Ill. 477, 64 N.E.2d 729
(1946); Iowa, Fay v. Smiley, 201 Iowa 1290, 207 N.W. 369 (1926); Maine, Poulson
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and certain local characteristics have developed. When one spouse transfers
an interest in the property he transfers a right of survivorship only.' An
attaching creditor of one spouse or a purchaser at an execution sale gets the
same contingent interest. 5 The present case advances another proposed attribute of entireties-that they can be created in personal property, more
specifically, a bank account. In 1925 the Tennessee Court of Appeals held
such a concept untenable in the state.6 Since then the rule has clearly been
otherwise, entireties being allowed in furniture,7 stocks,8 and a monetary
bequest. 9 Even before 1925 it was held that a chose in action held jointly
by husband and wife would pass to the survivor. 10 As a leading decision in
the state has observed, the chief objection to such tenancies-i.e., the common law power of the husband exclusively to dispose of or use the entire
property-has been removed by statute whereby the wife holds her property
as a single woman. 1 i
Text writers generally discuss entireties as applicable only to realty.'Yet at least ten of the twenty entirety jurisdictions extend the doctrine to
all assets, 13 while eight limit it to realty 14 and two have no definite rulings
v. Poulson, 70 A.2d 868 (Me. 1950) ; Minnesota, Semper v. Coates, 93 Minn. 76, 100
N.W. 662 (1904) ; New Hampshire, Stilphen v. Stilphen, 65 N.H. 126, 23 Atl. 79 (1889) ;
South Carolina, Green v. Connady, 77 S.C. 193, 57 S.E. 823 (1907); Wisconsin, Hass
v. Williams, 218 Wis. 429, 261 N.W. 216 (1935). Georgia has abolished tenancy by
implication. Lott v. Wilson, 95 Ga. 12, 21 S.E. 992 (1894). Kansas has reached the
same result by inference. Holmes v. Holmes, 70 Kan. 892, 79 Pac. 163 (1905). Four
states have abrogated tenancy by the entirety by relying on a combination of the married
women's property acts and other legislation: Montana, Emery v. Emery, 200 P.2d 251,
263 (Mont. 1948) semble; North Dakota, N.D. Ray. CODE § 47-0205 (1943); South
Dakota, In re Lower's Estate, 48 S.D. 173, 203 N.W. 312 (1925); West Virginia,
Irvin v. Stover, 67 W. Va. 356, 67 S.E. 1119 (1910). In three states tenancy by the
entirety does not differ from joint tenancy: Wolfe v. Wolfe, 42 So.2d 438 (Miss. 1949) ;
OKLk. STAT. tit. 60, § 74 (Cune. Supp. 1949) (levy and sale by a creditor may constitute
severance) ; UTAH CODE AN.N. § 80-12-5 (1943).
4. Sloan v. Sloan, 182 Tenn. 162, 184 S.W.2d 391, 392 (1945).
5. Cole Mfg. Co. v. Collier, 95 Tenn. 115, 31 S.W. 1000 (1895).
6. Scholze v. Scholze, 2 Tenn. App. 80, 92 (M.S. 1925).
7. Moore v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App. 239, 156 S.W.2d 84 (E.S. 1941).
8. State v. Progressive Building & Loan Ass'n, 174 Tenn. 597, 129 S.W.2d 513
(1939)
9. Ciampbell v. Campbell, 167 Tenn. 77, 66 S.W.2d 990 (1934).
10. Smith v. Haire, 133 Tenn. 343, 181 S.W. 161, 164 Ann. Cas. 1916D 529 (1915);
Pile v. Pile, 74 Tenn. 508, 40 Am. Rep. 50 (1880); Johnson v. Lusk, 46 Tenn. 113,
98 Am. Dec. 445 (1868); McMillan v. Mason, 45 Tenn. 263, 98 Am. Dec. 401 (1868).
11. Campbell v. Campbell, 167 Tenn. 77, 66 S.W.2d 992 (1934).
12. See, e.g., 2 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 430-36 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
13. Jordan v. Jordan, 228 S.W.2d 636 (Ark. 1950) (note); Cross v. Pharr, 221
S.W.2d 24 (Ark. 1949) (checking account) ; Black v. Black, 199 Ark. 609, 135 S.W.2d
837 (1940) (bank account); Hoyle v. Hoyle, 66 A.2d 130 (Del. Ch. 1949) (bank
account) ; Rauht v. Reinhart, 180 AtI. 913 (Del. Orph. 1935) (mortgage); Flaherty
v. Columbus, 41 App. D.C. 525 (1914) (money); Rader v. First Nat. Bk. in Palm
Beach, 42 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1949) (war bonds); Dodson v. National Title Ins. Co., 159
Fla. 371, 31 So.2d 402 (1947) (sale price of land); American Cent. Ins. Co. of St.
Louis v. Whitlock, 122 Fla. 363, 165 So. 380 (mortgage); Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla.
303, 103 So. 833 (1925) (bank deposits); Beard v. Beard, 185 Md. 178, 44 A.2d 469
(1945) (stock); Young v. Cockman, 182 Md. 246, 34 A.2d 428 (1943) (stock);
Hammond v. Dugan, 166 Md. 402, 170 Atl. 757 (1934) (bonds); Brell v. Brell, 143
Md. 443, 122 Atl. 635 (1923) (stock); Childs v. Childs, 293 Mass. 67, 199 N.E. 383
(1936) (bond); Splaine v. Morrissey, 282 Mass. 217, 184 N.E. 670 (1933) (saving
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on the matter.' 5 The states of the first group when confronted with the
problem have applied entireties to bank accounts.' 6
One of the main advantages of tenancy by the entirety as an estate
planning instrumentality is that it is a rryethod of avoiding state inheritance

taxes,'1 the property passing automatically at the death of the first dying
spouse to the survivor. This avoidance is not effected in federal taxation,'"
nor does it now appear possible in Tennessee according to a recent decision
which held that where the decedent has paid for the whole of the property his
estate is taxed for the whole interest passing to the surviving spouse.'9
Despite the loss of certain tax advantages there appears to be no logical or
practical basis for disagreeing with the present holding. Tenancy by the
entireties is a useful tool in estate planning, especially where funds can be
transferred at death merely by depositing money in a bank, thus providing
substantial savings in probate, legal and administrative expenses. Personal
property, including money, may clearly be held in joint tenancy or tenancy in
common.20 Since personalty has long since supplanted realty as the basis of
our economy and the common law disabilities of women have been abolished,
no cogent reason remains for withholding the useful planning device of
tenancy by the entirety from such an integral element of present-day commercial life as the bank deposit.
deposit); Marble v. Jackson, 245 Mass. 504, 139 N.E. 442 (1923) (bank deposit)
McElroy v. Lynch, 232 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1950) (note); Cullom v. Rice, 236 Mo. App.
1113, 162 S.W.2d 342 (1942) (bank deposit) ; Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 166 Pa. Super. 6,
70 A.2d 481 (1950) (bank account); Blumner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 362 Pa. 7, 66
A.2d 245, 248 (1949) ; U.S. Nat. Bank in Johnstown v. Penrod, 354 Pa. 170, 47 A.2d
249 (1946) (bank account); Swanton Say. Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Tremblay, 113 Vt. 530,
37 A.2d 381 (1944) (cattle) ; George v. Dutton's Est., 94 Vt. 76, 108 Atl. 515 (1920)
(store property). For Tennessee cases, see Notes 6-8, supra. See Note, 117 A.L.R. 915.
14. Koehring v. Bowman, 194 Ind. 433, 142 N.E. 117, 118 (1924) (entireties can
exist in personal property derived from real property so held, e.g., crops); Able-Old
Hickory Building & Loan Ass'n v. Polansky, 47 A.2d 730, 731 (N.J. Ch. 1946) (stocks);
Franklin Nat. Bk. v. Freile, 116 N.J. Eq. 278, 173 Atl. 93 (1934) (promissory note);
In re McKinney's Estate, 175 Misc. 377, 24 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Surr. Ct. 1940); In re
Maguire's Will, 277 N.Y. 527, 13 N.E.2d 458 (1938) ; In re Blumenthal's Estate, 236
N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911 (1923) (bond and mortgage); Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42
S.E.2d 468 (1947) (funds from sale); Dozier v. Leary, 196 N.C. 12, 144 S.E. 368
(1928) (banknotes); Winchester Simmons Co. v. Cutler, 194 N.C. 698, 140 S.E. 622
(1927) (bonds); Manning v. U.S. Nat. Bank of Portland, 174 Ore. 118, 148 P.2d 255
(1944) (stock); Holman v. Mayo, 154 Ore. 241, 59 P.2d 392 (1936) (bank deposit) ;
Nunner v. Erickson, 151 Ore. 575, 51 P.2d 839 (1935) (mortgage note). All of the
Kentucky and Rhode Island cases deal only with land.
15. See Nussbacher v. Manderfeld, 64 Wyo. 55, 186 P.2d 548 (1947); Richie,
Tenancies by the Entirety, etc., in Virginia, 28 VA. L. REV. 608, 613 (1942).
16. See note 12, supra.
17. For an excellent treatment of the tax aspect of entireties, see Rudick, Federal
Tax Problems Relating to Property Owned in Joint Tenancy and Tenancy by the
Entirety, 4 TAx L. Rxv. 3 (1948).
18. INT. REv. CODE § 811(e).
19. Murfreesboro Bank & Trust Co. v. Evans, 241 S.W.2d 862 (Tenn. 1951).
20. See, e.g., Manning v. U. S. Nat. Bank of Portland, 174 Ore. 118, 148 P.2d 255
(1944) ; Dozier v. Leary, 196 N.C. 12, 144 S.E. 368 (1928) ; In re Blumenthal's Estate,
236 N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911 (1923).
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PLEADING-GENERAL ISSUE-SCOPE IN TENNESSEE
Defendants Rudd and Headrick were adjoining landowners. Plaintiffs
purchased the land belonging to dfendant Headrick on which there was a
cinder block wall and building located a few feet from the boundary of Rudd's
land. The defendants dumped dirt and rock into a gulley between these
structures and Rudd's adjoining lot. Plaintiffs sued for damages resulting
to the structures, alleging that the defendants by their wrongful, willful and
negligent conduct completely destroyed the wall and permanently damaged
the building. The defendants pleaded the general issue and at the trial were
allowed to show by cross-examination of one of the plaintiffs that he had
consented to this placing of the dirt upon his premises. Plaintiffs, appealing
from a judgment in favor of defendants, alleged as error the admission of
evidence of consent, asserting that the action was trespass and that justification was not admissible under a plea of the general issue. Held, affirmed.
The action was one of trespass on the case' and the defense of justification
was, therefore, admissible under a plea of the general issue. Sing v. Headrick,
236 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1950).
The decision appears to be in accord with the principles of common law
pleading, but its point of interest lies in the fact that Tennessee still requires
a defendant to study the common law forms of action to determine the scope
of the general issue. 2 By statute, one who has sustained injury to his person
or property, in which money only is demanded as damage, may be redressed
by an action on the facts of the case. 3 Similarly all contracts may be sued on
in the same form of action. 4 The intent of the legislature in enacting these
statutes was to abolish the distinctions between the various forms of action
and to create in their stead actions of contract and tort, and even to abolish
this distinction if it interferes with the intention of the pleader.5 Any pleading
is now sufficient if it conveys a reasonable certainty of meaning, and when by
a fair and natural construction it shows a substantial cause of action or de1. The court found the action to be trespass on the case since the plaintiffs failed
to allege a breaking and entering, but did allege negligence. Another factor was the
plaintiffs allegation that they "were and are without fault." This indicates the plaintiffs'
reliance on the allegation of negligence since if the defendant's conduct had been willful and wanton the exercise of care by the plaintiffs would be inconsequential.
2. Tennessee inherited the basic common law of England, and that body of rules
constituting the common law system of practice and pleading was rigidly adhered to until
1932 when the first substantial reform in the field of pleading was enacted. The availability of defenses under the general issue depends on what the action would have been
under the technical rules of common law pleading. Oliver Co. v. Greenwood, 4 Tenn.
C.C.A. 535 (1913).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8564 (Williams 1934).
4. Id. § 8563.

5. Besides actions of contract and tort the only other forms of action now in existence
are detinue [TEN. CoDE ANN. § 8566 (Williams 1934)], replevin (§ 8566) and ejectment (§ 8567).
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fense. 6 The enactment of these statutes was a long step forward in the field
of pleading in Tennessee. It eliminated the necessity for obtaining a writ in
the required form of action where an error in the choice of writs was fatal to.
the plaintiff's case.1 But there has been relatively little statutory reform from
the defendant's standpoint. The code allows the defendant to enter a general
denial to the plaintiff's cause of action, equivalent to the general issue at
common law.8 Thus, in an action based on the facts of the case the defendant
must determine under what common law form of action the plaintiff is bringing his suit before he can ascertain the scope of his general denial. Although
code section 8765 provides that a general denial shall be equivalent to. the
general issue at common law, the scope of the general issue in Tennessee has
not remained the same in all instances as it was at common law, and it does
not open the door to all defenses.
In trespass, whether to person or property, the plea "not guilty" denied
the essential allegations of the declaration and in trespass to property "not
guilty" also denied the plaintiff's possession. 9 In Tennessee the general denial
puts into issue two facts, the alleged wrongful act and the title of the plaintiff.10 If the defense is to rest upon any other facts the general issue will not
apply, and the defendant must resort to a special plea. In actions of trespass
on the case the plea "not guilty" permitted the defendant to show any defense by way of denial, excuse or discharge except the statute of limitations
and except truth in an action on the case for libel or slander., This is generally
the rule in Tennessee but, contrary to the common law rule, an accord and
2
satisfaction must be specially pleaded.'
At common law the plea of non cepit to an action of replevin denied the
taking and the place of taking and put the plaintiff to the proof of these
allegations only. 13 It did not deny the plaintiff's property in the chattel. But in
Tennessee the general issue is much broader. It puts in issue not only the
taking, but also the plaintiff's property in the chattel, and by statute all matters
4
of defense may be shown in evidence without resort to special plea.'
In detinue the plea of non detinet denied the plaintiff's allegation of
property in the chattel and its wrongful detention by the defendant, and put
6. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8728 (Williams 1934).
7. E.g., 1 CHITTY, PLEADING 106 (16th Am. ed. 1879).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8765 (Williams 1934).
9. 1 CHITTY, PLEADING 538; SHIPMAN, COMMON-LAW

1923).

PLEADING §

170 (3d ed.

10. CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT § 216 (7th ed., Gilreath, 1951); HIGGINS
AND CROWNOVER, TENNESSEE PROCEDURE IN LAW CASES § 584 (1937).
11. CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT §§ 221-22; SHIPMAN, CoMMoN-LAW
PLEADING § 173.
12. Gossett v. Railroad, 115 Tenn. 376, 89 S.W. 737 (1905) ; HIGGINS AND CROWNOVER, TENNESSEE PROCEDURE IN LAW CASES § 582.
13. 1 CHITTY, PLEADING 553; SHIPMAN, COMMON-LAW PLEADING § 178.
14. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9297 (Williams 1934) ; CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT
§ 218; HIGGINS AND CROWNovER, TENNESSEE PROCEDURE IN LAW CASES § 586.
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only these allegations in issue.' 5 Since, as has been shown, a general denial is
the equivalent of non detinet, only the aforementioned issues would appear to
be admissible under a general issue plea, but the Supreme Court of Tennessee
has held that the statute of limitations is included in the general issue, and
need not be specially pleaded.' 6
In an action of debt, nil debit denies that the defendant owes the plaintiff
anything, and so any defense which shows nothing due from the defendant to
the plaintiff, whether by way of denial, excuse or discharge, is admissible
under this pleaY' However, in debt on a written instrument a denial of the
execution of the instrument creating the debt can be made only by the special
8
plea, non est factuis.2
In an action for breach of covenant, non est facturn denies that the
defendant has executed the instrument. This plea admits the breach of covenant
and a special plea is required to deny it."9
In actions of assumpsit on an oral or implied promise, the general issue,
non assurnpsit, is broad enough to admit any defense which shows that the
defendant has not become legally liable for the breach of the alleged promise,
that it was void or voidable or that it has been performed. 20 The statute of
limitations, the statute of frauds, counter-claim, set-off and recoupment must
21
be specially pleaded.
In trover the general issue plea of "not guilty" was as broad as that in
case, and today every defense is available except the statute of limitations and
22
release.
By pleading "not guilty" in an action of ejectment, the defendant denies
that he is guilty of unlawfully withholding the premises claimed by the plain15. 1 CITrY, PLEADING 561; SHIPMAN, COMMoN-LAw PLEADING §

177.

16. Morrow v. Hatfield, 25 Tenn. 108 (1845). This case indicates that the statute
of limitations operates on the right and not upon the remedy. Contra: Hunter v. Starkes,

27 Tenn. 656 (1848).
17. Gillespie v. Darwin, 53 Tenn. 21 (1871); McGavock v. Puryear, 46 Tenn. 34
(1868); 1 CHITTY, PLEADING 510; SHIPMAN, COmmoN-LAw PLEADING § 184; HIGGINS
CROwNovER, TENNESSEE PROCEDURE IN LAW CASES § 576.
18. CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT § 223; 1 CHITTY, PLEADING 511. In

AND

Tennessee there are two pleas of non est factuin. General non est factun, which denies the

execution of the instrument and special non est factin which alleges an alteration of
the instrument, or seeks to avoid it upon some ground aside from the execution. Carter v.
Turner, 37 Tenn. 178, 182 (1857).
19. 1 CHITTY, PLEADING 514; SHIPMAN, COMMoN-LAW PLEADING § 187. It Is
suggested that the pleader pay particular attention to the common law rules before preparing his defenses for an action of covenant, and that special pleas be entered in actions
founded on covenants of warranty, seisin and against incumbrances, and actions on
covenants with collateral agreements attached. HIGGINS AND CROWNOVER, TENNESSEE PROcEDuRE IN LAW CASES §§ 579-80.
20. Bank of Commerce v. Porter, 60 Tenn. 447 (1872); CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF
A LAWSUIT § 223; SHIPMAN, COMMoN-LAW PLEADING § 182.
21. HIGGINS AND CROWNOVER, TENNESSEE PROCEDURE IN LAW CASES § 571.
22. CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT § 220; SHIPMAN, COMMON-LAw PLEAD-

ING § 176.
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tiff and upon such plea may avail himself of all legal defenses. 23 This plea,
however, admits that the defendant is in possession of the premises sued for,
24
and possession can be denied only by filing a special plea of disclaimer.
The problems raised by the instant case and the foregoing discussion on
the scope of the general issue indicate the difficulties of defensive pleading and
the need for further reform in Tennessee. A satisfactory reform in pleading
can best be accomplished by an elimination of the broad general denial and
a requirement of special pleas on which the defendant intends to rely. This
would eliminate most elements of surprise. The code provides that a plaintiff
may by motion require the defendant to plead specially. 25 The intention of the
legislators who enacted this section was to encourage special pleading, 26 but
this statute has been weakened by the fact that its application lies within the
discretion of the trial judge.2 7 To bring about a better system of pleading in
Tennessee the courts should not deny the request of the plaintiff requiring
the defendant to plead specially in any case, and particularly in actions of debt,
assumpsit and case. 28 In these actions there is virtually no limit to which the
defendant may go in establishing a defense under a general denial. Much has
been accomplished in the field of pleading in Tennessee, but there are many
areas where conditions may be improved.

TORTS-CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS-TORT LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE
INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Plaintiff, a patient in the defendant hospital, was being moved on a
stretcher by a nurse's aide to an adjoining building. While going down a
ramp the nurse's aide lost control of the stretcher which overturned
causing injury to the plaintiff. From an order directing a verdict in favor
of defendant, and from an order denying plaintiff's motion for a new
trial, the plaintiffs appeal. Held, reversed. Charitable institutions are liable
for the torts of their servants from which injury proximately results to a
third person, whether such person is a stranger, paying patient or nonpaying
patient. Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 230 P.2d 220 (Ariz. 1951).
23. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9128 (Williams 1934); CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT
SHIPMAN, COmiioN-LAw PLEADING § 188.
24. James v. Brooks, 53 Tenn. 150 (1871) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 9129 (Williams
1934) ; CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT § 217.
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8767 (Williams 1934). The Supreme Court of Tennessee

§ 217;

has held that one pleading specially under this section is not allowed to rely on a plea of
the general issue previously entered, but must plead affirmatively all defenses to be
relied on. Creekmore v. Woodard, 241 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn. 1951). See Comment, 5 VAND.
L. REv. (1951).
26. HIGGINS AND CRowNovm, TENNESSEE PROCEDURE IN LAW CASES § 663.
27. Id. §§ 566, 664.
28. Id. § 664.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL,. 5

A master is subject to liability to third persons for injuries caused by
the tortious conduct of servants within the scope of their employment.1
Should there be an exception to the stated rule because the master happens
to be a charitable institution? The initial decisions in American jurisdictions
adopted the "trust fund" theory. 2 This theory had its foundation in the
dictum of an early English case3 which stated that to give damages out of
a trust fund would not be to apply the fund to those objects which the
author of the fund had in view, but would divert it to a different purpose.
Though the "trust fund" theory had been repudiated in England, 4 it later
found acceptance in the United States.5 This laid the foundation for the
confusion concerning the problem which followed. Three principal theories
in addition to the above mentioned one were evolved in the effort to exempt
charitable institutions from tort liability :6 (1) the "waiver" theory assumes
that the beneficiary of the charity impliedly waives any claim for damages ;7
(2) the "public policy" theory demands that the charity must be preserved
for the public benefit and its funds. should not be diverted to the paying of
tort claims ;8 (3) the doctrine of respondeat superior is sometimes held not
applicable to institutions not conducted for profit., Almost from the time of
their conception all of these theories have met with much criticism, which
has been mounting in recent years.' 0
1. 3 COOLEY, TORTS § 391 (4th ed., Haggard, 1932); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §
219(1) (1933); Ferson, Bases for Master's Liability and for Principal's Liability to
Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. REv. 260 (1951) passint. See Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital,
66 Conn. 98, 33 AtI. 595 (1895).
2. McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876) ; Perry v.
House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885).
3. This dictum first appeared in Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Clark & Fin. 894, 7 Eng.
Rep. 934 (H.L. 1839). It was repeated in The Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross,
12 Clark & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (H.L. 1846) ; and in Holliday v. The Vestry of
the Parish of St. Leonard, 11 C.B.N.S. 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (C.P. 1861).
4. Duncan v. Findlater, supra note 3, was overruled by Mersey Docks & Harbour
Board, Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 H.L. Cas. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866). Holliday v.
The Vestry of the Parish of St. Leonard, supra note 3, was reversed by Foreman v. Mayor
of Canterbury, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871). The English dicta had distinctly been changed
prior to the Massachusetts case in 1876.
381, 75 N.E. 991 (1905) ; Fire
5. See Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill.
Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 674, 15 Atl. 553 (1888) ; see note 2 snpra.
6. PROSSER, TORTS 1079-85 (1941) ; 10 AMr. JUR., Charities §§ 145 et seq. (1937)
Ball, The Liability of CharitableInstitutions for Torts of Agents and Servants, 38 KY.
L.J. 105 (1949) ; Note, 14 A.L.R. 572, 585-97 (1921) ; 30 B.U.L. REv. 419 (1950) ; 14
B.U.L. REv. 477 (1934).
7. Powers v. Massachusetts Homoeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901),
cert. denied, 183 U.S. 695 (1901); Burdell v. St. Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal. App. 310,
173 Pac. 1008 (1918); Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho
350, 82 P.2d 849 (1938).
8. Currier v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 105 Fed. 886 (C.C.D.N.H. 1900);
Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanatorium of Tucson v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P.2d
118 (1935) ; Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895) ; Lindler
v. Columbia Hospital of Richland County, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914).
9. Union Pacific R.R. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (8th Cir. 1894) ; Hearns v. Waterbury
Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895) ; Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W.
173 (1916).
10. See notes 17-21, infra.
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RECENT CASES .

ISome courts, recognizing the untenable rationalization underlying, these
theories of immunity, have formulated other bases upon which to, rest their
conclusions. A substantial majority hold that in cases where the charity has
not exercised due care in the selection and retention of its employees, it
will be liable for injuries caused by the negligence of such employees."
Many courts make a distinction apparently in a manner similar to the waiver
theory between strangers to the charity who are allowed to recover, and
beneficiaries of it who are denied recovery.' 2 Others, while making the same
distinction, have held the charity liable to strangers and paying beneficiaries,
but the question of liability to nonpaying beneficiaries has not yet arisen
in the jurisdiction. 1 On the other hand, some courts have decided to
deny recovery to beneficiaries, but have not passed on the problem involving
strangers.' 4 Some colrts in jurisdictions which rely on the trust fund theory
have allowed suits to be maintained if the judgment could be satisfied from
funds other than those used to perpetuate the charity. 15 Most of the courts
making this distinction have expanded it so that now the judgment may be
satisfied by liability insurance obtained for this purpose.' 6
In recent years the trend away from immunity, which began almost
coincident with the adoption of the rule itself,1 7 and toward unqualified
liability, has accelerated somewhat. This trend is a result of many concurring
factors: the weaknesses in the theories of exemption,' 8 constant criticisms in
11. Haliburton v. General Hospital Society of Connecticut, 133 Conn. 61, 48 A.2d
261 (1946) ; Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918) ; Medical
& Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, 229 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). See
Note, 14 A.L.R. 599 (1921).
12. President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Lusk v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App.
1941) ; Winslow v. Veterans of Foreign Wars National Home, 328 Mich. 488, 44
N.W.2d 19 (1950) ; Jewell v. St. Peter's Parish, 10 N.J. Misc. 229, 76 A.2d 917 (Sup.
Ct. 1950).
13. Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836, 842 (10th Cir. 1941);
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Nicholsen v.
Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940).
14. Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930);
Bruce v. Young Men's Christian Association, 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798 (1929) ; Bishop
Randall Hospital v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385 (1916).
15. Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918); Moore v.
Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950); Gamble v. Vanderbilt University, 138 Tenn.
616, 200 S.W. 510 (1918).
16. O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Association, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.2d
835 (1939); Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S.W.2d 284
(M.S. 1938). See James & Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts,
15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 431, 439 (1950); 1 VAND. L. Rzv. 470 ,(1948).
17. As early as 1879 Rhode Island repudiated the Massachusetts trust fund theory
and held that an employer or master was liable for the negligence of his servants if
committed in the course of the servant's employment. Glavin v. The Rhode Island
Hospital, 12 R.I. 411 (1879). However, the legislature of this state changed the policy
set forth above in R.I. GEN. LAWs c.248 § 95 (1923) in order to exempt the charity
from liability to beneficiaries, but other parties may recover. Basabo v. Salvation
Army, 35 R.I. 22, 85 At. 120 (1912). The statute has since been repealed.
18. The weakness of the trust fund theory lies in the fact that it is contrary to
the general rule that trust funds are not exempt from liability for torts comrhitted in

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ Vol,. 5

legal periodicals and treatises'0 and court decisions criticizing previous holdings-some overruling,20 some distinguishing so as to allow recovery in
certain instances 21 and some deciding the issue for the first time. 22 Therein
lies the importance of the instant case. It is the second court2 within the
last two years which has flatly overruled the law in its state and in conformity with the trend has declared the law to be that of unqualified liability.
This trend will probably continue; it is likely that in the near future the
majority rule will have shifted from partial immunity to that of unqualified
liability.
administering the trust and that, since they would not be exempt in the hands of the
donor himself, he can scarcely confer such immunity upon them. See Hordern v.
Salvation Army, 199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.E. 626 (1910) ; Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R.I.
22, 85 Atl. 120 (1912). The waiver theory does violence to the facts; a patient goes to
the hospital because he expects better care than he would receive at home, and he
certainly does not in reality consent to be treated with negligence. See Phillips v. Buffalo
General Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924) ; Gamble v. Vanderbilt University,
138 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W. 510 (1918). The public necessity which supported the public
policy theory is no longer in existence. Charities are now sound institutions; any
judgment granted against them would not impair the continuance of this worthy cause.
See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) ; Glavin v. The Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411 (1879). The doctrine of
respondeat superior has been applied in cases of liability for injuries to strangers and
servants but not applied to beneficiaries. There seems to be no valid basis for this
inconsistency. See Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110
N.W. 951 (1907) ; Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1888).
19. PRoSsER, TORTS 1079-85 (1941); Appleman, The Tort Liability of Charitable
Institutions, 22 A.B.A.J. 48 (1936) ; Ball, The Liability of Charitable Institutions for
Torts of Agents and Servants, 38 Ky. L.J. 105 (1949) ; Feezer, The Tort Liability of
Charities, 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 191 (1928); Notes, 22 VA. L. Rzv. 58 (1935); 48
YA.E L.J. 81 (1938); 30 B.U.L. Rhv. 419 (1950); 14 B.U.L. RFv. 477 (1934). Cf.
Zollman, Damage Liability of Charitable Institutions, 19 MIcH. L. Rzv. 395 (1921),
rejecting all reasons but one. The court in the instant case was strongly influenced by
law review discussions.
20. See the instant case and Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n. 45 N.W.2d
151 (Iowa 1950).
21. O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Association, 105 Colo. 259, 56 P.2d
835 (1939); Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950) ; Baptist Memorial
Hospital v. Couillens, 176 Tenn. 300, 140 S.W.2d 1088 (1940). Cf. Justice Rutledge's
opinion in President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
22. Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 83 A.2d 753 (Del. Super. 1951) ; Nicholson
v. Good Samaritan Hospital 145 Fla. 360. 199 So. 344 (1940); Foster v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950); accord, Rickbeil v.
Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946); ef. Mulliner v.
Evangelische Diakonniessenvereln, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920).
23. The other state referred to is Iowa. Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Association, 45 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 1950). See Spencer, Ray v. Tucson Medical Center,
A Re-Appraisal of the Tort Liability of Charities,24 Rocxy MT. L. RE-v. 71 (1951).

